Home Articles in English Articles in German Articles in Hebrew Editorial Services Facebook Page The Media Blog Message Board Links Client Testimonials About Contact Blog-Ed: Opinion Page Who Am I? Home Articles in English Articles in German Articles in Hebrew New York Stories Raoul Wallenberg German-Jewish Dialogue Global Headlines Exchange Ideas Who Am I? Links Contact

News Flashes:

On Nov. 11, Arafat was pronounced dead. On Nov. 12, a state funeral was held in Cairo that was closed to the public. Arafat was buried in his compound in Ramallah in a chaotic ceremony.

11/4: Arafat slipping in and out of a coma. Conflicting reports of his possible death; Israeli sources say that Arafat is "clinically dead."

10/29: Arafat was flown to Paris for emergency medical treatment. Israeli officials speculate that Arafat is terminally ill with leukemia. Very few people gathered outside Arafat's headquarters to express their concern for their leader's health. Ha'aretz quoted unnamed Palestinian sources as saying Arafat was rambling and incoherent, mentally incapacitated and unable even to recognize his closest confidants. His abruptly declining health raised immediate questions about a successor and left the PA scrambling. Former PM Mahmoud Abbas was brought up in every consultation as the man who could fill the vacuum in the Palestinian political system.

Some political observers predict that if Arafat dies, one direct result could be the shelving of Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza — on the assumption that a new partner may arise.

10/12: Arafat's cousin, General Moussa Arafat, the overall commander of the Palestinian National Security Forces in the Gaza Strip, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt when a car bomb exploded near his convoy. The attempt on his life appeared to be Palestinian, not Israeli. No group has claimed responsibility for the blast, which is seen as a sign of mounting tensions between rival Palestinian security forces and militias in the Gaza Strip. (Ha'aretz)

10/1/04: The Jordanian independent daily Al-Arab al-Youm reports that senior U.S. administration officials, who met with Arafat's personal advisor Abu Rodeina, have told him that if Arafat fails to implement the commitments he made to the U.S. by November, the administration will remove its objection to his being expelled by Israel.
9/28/04: Hamas called on its followers to vote in upcoming Palestinian local elections Dec. 9, highlighting its new determination to enter politics and challenge Arafat's dominance, reports the AP. A strong Hamas campaign could pose a formidable challenge to Arafat.
That same day, according to Yediot Aharonot's Eli Vaked, members of the Fatah faction in the Palestinian Legislative Council asked Arafat to fire the government of Prime Minister Abu Alla, and threatened that if he did not, they would vote no-confidence in the Abu Alla government. In the background to the current crisis is an additional chill in relations between Arafat and Abu Alla. Palestinian sources said that in recent weeks, Abu Alla has boycotted meetings of the Fatah central committee and the national security council in connection with Arafat's refusal to reform the security services in response to Egyptian requests.
9/22/2004: A new Palestinian public opinion poll, taken by the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University's Political Science department, shows that
75 percent of the Palestinians want new elections for the presidency and the legislative council as soon as possible, reports Ma'ariv. According to the poll, if presidential election were held tomorrow, Arafat would get only 46 percent of the votes. Although this puts him in the lead, it shows a major drop in his popularity, and for the first time, Arafat no longer commands a vast majority. Until now, all polls had given him comfortable two-thirds majorities.

9/10/2004: According to WorldNetDaily, the FBI has opened an investigation into the involvement of Yasser Arafat in the murders of two U.S. diplomats in Sudan in 1973. Thirty-one years ago, eight members of the Black September terrorist organization, part of Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO, stormed the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, reportedly on Arafat's orders, taking U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel, diplomat Charge d'Affaires George Curtis Moore and others hostage, and one day later killing Noel, Moore and Belgian diplomat Guy Eid. If Arafat is charged with the murders, a warrant would be issued for his arrest, making him a fugitive in the U.S.
9/6/2004:Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that the government remains committed to "removing" Yasser Arafat from the Palestinian territories, Ha'aretz reported. "The state of Israel will find the way and the right time to bring about the removal of Yasser Arafat from the region," Mofaz said.
9/2/2004: The Palestinian Legislative Council suspended its sessions for one month in a highly-embarrassing move for President Yasser Arafat, protesting the Ra'is' refusal to sign 12 laws passed by the council that call for major financial and security reforms in the PA. According to the Jerusalem Post, "Palestinian legislators said they are frustrated with Arafat's 'empty promises' to the council and threatened to escalate their campaign after the one-month strike."


Articles in English


Pioneer Journalist Nellie Bly

Glass Ceiling in Media

Joint Distribution Committee: "Grandpa's Safe Haven"

A Conversation with Arianna Huffington

Culture Gaps and Gaffes: Perception Is Everything

A Reluctant Freelancer

A Conversation with Helen Thomas

Israel vs. the United Nations

Yasser Arafat—Legacy or Lunacy?

No Peace, No Process?

The Israeli Press Reacts to the Road Map: Bumpy Road Ahead

The Israeli Press Reacts to the Prisoner Exchange with Hizbollah

Israel’s Security Fence—Back To The Wall

A Woman President in the White House?

New York Stories:
Freedom of Speech

New York Stories:
9/11—Tilting at Windmills

German Press on Iraq: Front Line Berlin

Bush Takes On Europe—Again

A European in New York

Jewish Lawyers Defending Anti-Semites?

Cooperation and Competition — American Jewry and Israel's Development

In Memoriam Yehuda Amichai

In Memoriam Hildegard Knef

2000... And the Emperor Still Has No Clothes



The World Press on:


Czech Republic










People Making Headlines in...









Home Page > Articles in English > Yasser Arafat



Legacy or Lunacy?

The Arafat Mystique

by Tekla Szymanski

Yasser Arafat

"Even though [Arafat] ceased to be an enemy, he remained an adversary in partner's clothing. Without Arafat, the Palestinians would not have got as far as they did.
But with him, and because of him, they were unable to get any farther."
Ha'aretz, Tel Aviv, Nov. 12, 2004)

"Palestinians are resilient. They will learn how to deal with life without Arafat and his mystique.
Their national unity remains and it will strengthen their fight, even in grief."
(Ramzy Baroud, Al-Ahram, Cairo, November 4-10, 2004)

At the end, Yasser Arafat was tired and isolated — an eccentric, senile man, decked out in olive-green dress fatigues, carefully pulling the kaffiyeh tighter around his sullen face with trembling hands. Trapped in the disguise of a militant guerilla fighter and not able to transform himself into a respected statesman, all that remained was a warrior without clothes.

His watery eyes were always wide open, as if perpetually perplexed. His sparse beard, the growth of a sixteen-year-old, framed thick, cracked lips, and was unkempt. Arafat, a battered prisoner living in his partly destroyed headquarters in Ramallah (according to cynical Israelis, "in carefully preserved half-ruins"), where the Israeli army kept him under house arrest since September 2002.

An image gone? Not so fast.

What's the Matter
With the Palestinians?

(Joel Marcus, Ha'aretz 10/5/2004): “Why, every time the door opens a crack for some Israeli compromise or concession, do the Palestinians suddenly have this urge to maim and kill?

Why, after the Oslo Accords, which Israel went through hell and high water to approve, did they unleash a campaign of bloody terror?

Why did they launch another wave of terror at the split second that another opportunity arose for a settlement brokered by President Clinton at Camp David?

Why is every senior American peacemaker sent here always greeted by a terror attack that sabotages the mission even before it begins?

Why, when the patriarch of the settlements decides to disengage from Gaza, have the Palestinians gone on a rampage?

Why are they attacking, ambushing, and wildly shooting Kassam rockets at Sderot? I say Palestinians, and not Hamas, because the PA [Palestinian Authority] has more power and say. If the PA didn't want Sderot bombarded, it wouldn't be.

With all due respect for the Palestinians' right to an independent state, there's a screw loose somewhere.”

Arafat was the eternal prisoner, and the Palestinians, who also see themselves as prisoners, could identify. But for more than a year before his death, the septuagenarian was faced with open rebellion in the legislature of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and within his power base, Fatah. Yet, he bounced back, again and again, astonishingly well for a man his age. Nevertheless, a taboo had been shattered.

Some Palestinians were desperately trying to shatter more than an image. The so-called old guard within Fatah — Arafat and his men (the "made-in-Tunis regime" that was allowed to return in 1993 from exile to the West Bank following the Oslo accords) — has been accused of corruption by the so-called new guard within Fatah, those pragmatic, pro-reform young Palestinians, intellectuals among them, who launched the first Intifadah in the 1980s, fought on the ground while Arafat — the Ra'is ["the head," "the leader" in Arabic] to his people — still lived in hiding in exile; this young guard has started to doubt the merit of the uprisings. Arafat, however, stressed in an exclusive interview with Tel Aviv's liberal Ha'aretz (July 7, 2004) that he gave clear orders, after the Intifadah had started, to cease the attacks and stop any suicide bombers.

Arafat "turned the promise of his return to Palestine into a hell for his own people," opines Canadian journalist and political scientist Salim Mansur. "He destroyed the internal leadership [now mostly affiliated with the new guard] that had emerged in the wake of the first Intifadah, placed his cronies from exile into positions of influence and ran the territories under limited autonomy as a police state."

Now, the new guard, eager to get its act together before Israel unilaterally withdraws from the Gaza Strip next year, is demanding transparency and accountability within the PA. Mansur believes that the opposition to Arafat's rule "has the makings of a third Palestinian Intifadah," this time, "against Arafat and his henchmen. Arafat's behavior has been deeply humiliating to Palestinians.... They deserve better from a leader who could not have returned from exile without their sacrifices."

Mohammed Dahlan, Chief Conspirator?

Meet the main conspirator — 44-year-old Mohammed Dahlan, who has accused Arafat of "sitting on a pile of Palestinian corpses." The former head of the Preventive Security Service (PSS) in Gaza, then interior minister during Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas' short term (Abbas resigned last year in protest of Arafat's continued refusal to implement change), Dahlan is seen as the leader of the new guard. An eloquent opportunist, a moderate, respected by the Americans, the Israelis and the Europeans (and, according to rumors, with good connections to numerous foreign secret services), Dahlan encourages elections and is well liked in the Gaza Strip but lesser known in the West Bank.

He has attacked the corruption within the PA, even though Arafat's loyalists claim that he is far from clean himself. After the demands for reform were made, Arafat refused to meet with Dahlan, who had given Arafat public reassurance in an interview with the London-based Saudi-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Aug. 12, 2004), "President Arafat does not have to be afraid of me. He should be worried about some of the hypocrites around him. I have no ambitions to replace President Arafat, but this will not stop me from demanding reforms."

The third component in this internal power struggle are the militant wings of Fatah — the Jenin Martyrs' Brigades, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Abu Rish Brigades, all of which receive funding and weapons from Arafat, as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad with their own agendas. Political reforms and democratization, however, are far from their concern.

According to Tel Aviv's mass circulation Yediot Aharonot, had it come to a showdown between Dahlan and Arafat, Hamas would have sided with the Ra'is. Why? Because Dahlan threatened to disarm Hamas if that is what it would take to bring stability to the region. In addition, the corrupt PA is a perfect cover for Hamas' underground work. According to Yediot's Alex Fishman, the Israeli Army believes that after the withdrawal from Gaza, all hell will break loose. Hamas and Arafat, hand in hand, would have tried to prove that Israel was to blame for the loss of control within the Gaza Strip.

Dahlan, therefore, is interested in working with Egypt and making the withdrawal and its aftermath as smooth as possible — exactly what Arafat and Hamas wanted to prevent.

Shortly before the Rai's' death, Egypt had started to negotiate with Arafat over structural and political changes within the PA in exchange for much-needed assistance to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip once Israel pulls out. Arafat, as expected, appeared reluctant to cooperate. But, during an interview with Ha'aretz (July 7, 2004), Arafat denied those allegations of stonewalling. To the question of whether he would hesitate, after an Israeli pullout, to risk the unity of his camp and fight Hamas, Arafat answered: "Even against anyone from Fatah who comes out against the law. I am respecting my word, my position." And he stressed that he was working with Egypt on security in Gaza. Ha'aretz' reporters also learned from the Ra'is that "at the end of the day, it was he who had signed Oslo and he who had negotiated at Camp David. His implication was unmistakable: As long as he lived, he was the only man to do business with."

Can Gaza Become a Democratic Enclave?

How strange that the democratic reform movement has its roots in the Gaza Strip, which was always regarded as backward compared with the West Bank, a refugee enclave that shelters the militant Hamas amid poverty, unemployment (running at 70 percent) and despair. "Give people jobs, bread and butter," explains one PA official on why the West Bank is lacking any reform spirit so far; "[then] they [don't] care how many ministers they have or don't have."

Ironically, it was also Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon — "The Butcher," as Palestinians refer to him — who has triggered their will to reform with his declaration of planned unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of Israel's settlements there. Israel has additional leverage over Gaza's internal affairs: Any Israeli incursion into Gaza following rocket attacks against Israeli settlements in the area played into Arafat's hands and allowed him to dismiss Dahlan's relentless finger pointing as ill-timed, selfish, even unpatriotic. And that is exactly what the Ra'is wanted to do.

Arafat, the leader — who, according to the New York-based financial Wall Street Journal, "has come to represent the act of self-delusion on a massive international scale" — is not a man of change. But, according to WSJ, "Where Arafat spends the rest of his life is not important. What matters is for the world to recognize that it is time to get rid of [him]." Arafat reluctantly, and accompanied by much theatrical hemming and hawing, agreed to some cosmetic changes within the PA. He pledged an overhaul of its centralized security apparatus — but the old man stayed mostly in charge. The German liberal weekly Die Zeit has put it nicely: "He began his career as a terrorist, and he is not able to let go, even though he must realize that people like him are not needed any longer in times of peace."

A Mandela of Palestine he was not. Neither was he a Fidel Castro in complete control of his flock. The mild-mannered Shimon Peres called him "a fruitcake." Ariel Sharon considered him "irrelevant." A wry editorial in the New York Times once declared: "We have no illusions about Mr. Arafat suddenly becoming the Palestinian Queen Mother."

A Man Taking Up Arms

Arafat, the eternal warrior. One of the founders of the Palestinian Fatah ["conquest"] movement in 1965, he has taken up his armed struggle, drawing inspiration from the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962), a guerilla war of national liberation against a colonial power, France. In 1969, he was elected head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and, in 1989, he appointed himself "President of the State of Palestine." In 1993, following the signing of the Oslo accords, he triumphantly returned with his cadres to the West Bank.

In 1996, he was officially and overwhelmingly elected president. He has always been fighting his war, using all means at his disposal, smuggling arms, diverting aid money and paying off confidants and cronies hungry for presidential perks, always with his eyes on an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Sometimes, he chooses to be part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and sometimes he even reluctantly condemns terrorist acts.

As Arafat the peacemaker, he was hiding behind his Nobel Peace Prize and the slogan "peace of the brave" (used by President Bill Clinton in his speech on the occasion of the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians on September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C. "A peace of the brave is within our reach.").

Talking peace had become one of Arafat's demagogic tools to achieve his end — which to many commentators seemed a means for self-destruction in the long run. He replaced his pre-Oslo armed struggle with a "phased strategy," claimed Efraim Karsh in the Middle East Quarterly magazine (Spring 2004): To seize whatever territory Israel is willing to cede, using it as a springboard for additional territorial gains and thus gradually achieving a "complete liberation of Palestine." Karsh continues: "Arafat has never been as interested in the attainment of statehood as in the violence attending its pursuit."

"Arafat, architect of the Palestinian national movement, is now concluding his career by being its undertaker," summarized Barry Rubin in the conservative Jerusalem Post (July 26, 2004.) "Arafat has led his people into a dead end, [clutching] the steering wheel as he plows the Palestinian vehicle into a stone wall." For Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel's foreign minister in 2000, Arafat is "not a leader connected to the ground [but] a religious man...focused on mythological issues."

But that's not all. "Not only has Arafat not built anything, but he has turned the Israeli right into the majority," fumes Yoel Marcus in Ha'aretz (July 30, 2004.) "It's hard to say which is worse." And, according to the Middle East Quarterly's Barry Rubin, "The legacy of justifying violence without limit is a devastating part of the post-Arafat heritage for Palestinians. Arafat simultaneously speaks the language of nationalism and Islamism. Many [of his followers] will regard a war on Israel as the route to avoid war among the Palestinians. [Arafat's] legacy is the cul-de-sac in which the Palestinians are stuck. He will go down in history as the man who put the Palestinians on the political stage. But it will take a very different kind of leadership to [effect] the most decisive change: getting the state of Palestine on the political map. Thanks to Arafat, that task will be more difficult, not easier, than it would have been just a few years ago."

Forced to Clean Up His Act

"... Oslo was stalled due to the actions of the various Israeli governments; afterwards there was Camp David and after that the Intifada. Sharon's visit [to the Temple Mount] was a bad beginning after which came the Intifada, and the continuation [of the Intifada] was the worst thing. I think now that the Intifada in its entirety was a mistake and it should not have continued, in particular what is called 'the militarization of the Intifada'..."

—Abu Mazen, Al-Rai, Jordan, Oct. 5, 2004

The urge for political and structural change came in September 2002, after the second Intifadah, begun in October 2000, had already cost the lives of thousands of Palestinians and wasn't going anywhere. Says Dahlan: "We are deceiving ourselves.... We failed to make peace and to make war. We failed at both. We have to decide now: Are we going to have war or peace?" Some commentators called the second Intifadah a fraud that provided Islamic extremists with a cover for unleashing a guerilla war against Israel.

In March 2003, Arafat was forced to make substantial changes within the framework of the American-brokered "road map," a new peace initiative built on the ruins of the Oslo accords. Arafat was to appoint a prime minister, an interior minister and a finance minister, to end, as Palestinian legislator Hanan Ashrawi later put it bluntly, "his one-man show and to put this solo performance behind us."

Arafat's hand-picked choice, Mahmoud Abbas, a.k.a Abu Mazen, however, resigned six months later because his attempts to overhaul the many Palestinian security forces — to unite them under one authority, not Arafat's, and to reform its institutions — came up against fierce resistance from the Ra'is and ultimately proved to be futile. The irony: Now, Abu Mazen is back with a vengeance; he was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in the Jan. 9 2005 presidential elections. According to the New York Times, Abu Mazen refused to talk to Arafat in the last 16 months of the late Palestinian president's life, and he has now pledged to end the armed Palestinian uprising once and for all.

But until Arafat's death, all attempts for reforms had stagnated and ground to a halt. Arafat, as always, had the last word. "This is the way of a paranoid, neurotic revolutionary," wrote Gisela Dachs in Die Zeit (Sept. 11, 2003), "who mistrusts everybody and everything.... Only during times of anarchy and chaos does Arafat's world exist. Only then do his people look up to him."

In September 2003, Arafat quickly appointed a new prime minister: Ahmed Qureia, a.k.a Abu Ala. But he submitted his resignation in June 2004. Arafat completely ignored the fallout from this second throwing up of hands, until he was rudely awakened by mass demonstrations — proving that times had indeed changed for the "Arab street."

Nobody could have taken Arafat's place though. Not while he was still alive. He is the symbol of the Palestinian struggle to his mostly European followers abroad. He is the leader and the father of the Palestinians, the personification of their national aspirations. People may loathe him, but he could gather the masses behind him. He traveled the world; some say, he was charming. But he never appointed a likely successor (as few leaders in the Arab world have done), and the Palestinians have now started to doubt that the Ra'is had their best interests at heart.

What is remarkable amid all this internal political chaos is that some members of the new guard have kept their optimism. "Many nations have a leader as a symbol," says Palestinian Legislative Council member Muhammad Horani, "but that which remains is the nation itself. The Palestinians will be able to manage without him. We have enough leaders left, both social and cultural, not to fall into anarchy."

1 2

Home Page > Articles in English > Yasser Arafat